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ABSTRACT 
We propose a novel privacy-preserving security solution for cloud services. Our solution is based on an efficient non-
bilinear group signature scheme providing the anonymous access to cloud services and shared storage servers. The 
novel solution offers anonymous authenticationfor registered users. Thus, users' personal attributes (age, valid 
registration, successful payment) can be proven without revealing users' identity, and users can use cloud services 
without any threat of profiling their behavior. However, if a user breaks provider's rules, his access right is revoked.Our 
solution provides anonymous access, unlinkability and the confidentiality of transmitted data. We implement our solution 
as a proof of concept applicationand present the experimental results. Further, we analyzecurrent privacy preserving 
solutions for cloud services and group signature schemes as basic parts of privacy enhancing solutions in cloud services. 
We compare the performance of our solution with the related solutionsand schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cloud services are becoming indisputable parts 
of modern information and communication 
systems and step into our daily lives. Some 
cloud services such as Amazon's Simple 
Storage Service, Box.net, CloudSafe etc. use 
user identity, personal data and/or the location of 
clients.Therefore, these cloud computing 
services open a number of security and privacy 
concerns. The current research challenge in 
cloud services is the secure and privacy-
preserving authentication of users. Users, who 
store their sensitive information like financial 
information, health records, etc., have a 
fundamental right of privacy. There are few 
cryptographic tools and schemes like 
anonymous authentication schemes, group 
signatures, zero knowledge protocols that can 
both hide user identity and provide 
authentication. The providers of cloud services 
need to control the authentication process to 
permit the access of only valid clients to their 
services. Further, they must be able to revoke 
malicious clients and reveal their identities.  
 
In practice, hundreds of users can access cloud 
services at the same time. Hence, the 
verification process of user access must be as  
 
 
efficient as possible and the computational 
cryptographic overhead must be minimal. 
 
We propose a novel security solution for cloud 
services that offers anonymous authentication 
based on group signatures. We aim mainly on the 
efficiency of the authentication process and user 
privacy. Our solution also provides the 
confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data 
between users and cloud service providers. 
Moreover, we implement our solution as a proof-of-
concept application and compare the performance 
of our solution with related schemes. Our results 
show that our solution is more efficient than the 
related solutions. 
 
The paper is organized as follow: The next 
section presents the related work. Then, we 
analyse cryptographic privacy-preserving 
schemes used in cloud computing. In section 4, 
we describe group signatures. In section5, 
wepresent our solution and we introduce our 
novel privacy-preserving cryptographic scheme 
for cloud services in section 6. Section 7contains 
our experimental results and the performance 
analysis and comparison. Finally, the conclusion 
of our work is presented. 
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2. Related work 
 
Privacy-preserving cloud computing solutions have 
been developed from theoretical recommendations 
to concrete cryptographic proposals. 
 
There are many works which deal with general 
security issues in cloud computing but only few 
works deal also with user privacy. 
 
The authors [1] explore the cost of common 
cryptographic primitives (AES, MD5, SHA-1,RSA, 
DSA, and ECDSA) and their viability for 
cloudsecurity purposes. The authors deal with the 
encryption of cloud storage but do not mention 
privacy-preserving access to a cloud storage. 
 
The work [2] employs a pairing based signature 
scheme BLS to make the privacy-preserving 
security audit of cloud storage data by the Third 
Party Auditor (TPA). The solution uses batch 
verification to reduce communication overhead 
from cloud server and computation cost on TPA 
side.Further, the paper [3] introduces the 
verification protocols that can accommodate 
dynamic data files. The paper explores the 
problem of providing simultaneous public 
auditability and data dynamics for remote data 
integrity check in Cloud Computing in a privacy-
preserving way.These solutions [2] and [3] provide 
privacy-preserving public audit but do not offer the 
anonymous access of users to cloud services. 
 
The work [4] establishes requirements for a 
secure and anonymous communication system 
that uses a cloud architecture (Tor and Freenet). 
Nevertheless, the author does not outline any 
cryptographic solution. Another non-cryptographic 
solution ensuring user privacy in cloud scenarios 
is presented in[5]. The authors propose a client-
based privacy manager which reduces the risk of 
the leakage of user private information.In the 
paper [6], authors use a non-cryptographic 
approach to obtain the benefits of the public cloud 
storagewithout exposing the content of files. The 
approach is based on redundancy techniques 
including an information dispersal algorithm 
(IDA).Nevertheless, these solutions do not protect 
against the linkability of user sessions which can 
cause unauthorized user profiling. 
 
Jensen et al. [7] propose an anonymous and 
accountable access method to cloud based on 
ring and group signatures. Nevertheless, their 
proposal uses a group signature scheme [8] 
which is inefficient because the signature size 
grows with the number of users. 
 
The work [9] presents a security approach which 
uses zero-knowledge proofs providing user 
anonymous authentication. The main drawback of 
the proposal is a large communication overhead 
between a user and a cloud server due to the Fiat-
Shamir identification scheme [10]. In the work [11], 
the author uses the CLsignature scheme [12] and 
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge to achieve 
user's anonymous access to services like digital 
newspapers, digital libraries, music collections, etc. 
 
The work [13] presents a cryptographic scheme to 
ensure anonymous user access to information and 
the confidentiality of sensitive documents in cloud 
storages. The work[14]deals with anonymity and 
unlinkability in cloud services by provided group 
signature schemes[15]. In the next section, we 
analyze the solutions [11], [13] and [14]. 
 
3..Performance analysis of cryptographic 
privacy-preserving solutions used in cloud 
computing 
 
In this section, we investigate the current 
cryptographic solutions which provide the 
anonymous or pseudonymous access to cloud 
services and shared storages.We aim on the 
authentication phases used in privacy-preserving 
cloud services. In the following performance 
analysis, we take into account only expensive 
operations like bilinear pairings (p), modular 
exponentiation (e) and multiplication (m). 
According to the results of works [16], [17], we omit 
the fast operations like addition, subtraction or 
hash functions which have a minimal impact on the 
overall performance. The times of expensive 
pairing operations have been measured for 
example in [25]. 
 
Table 1shows the performance analysis of the 
Blantom solution [11], the Lu et al. solution[13], the 
Chow et al. solution [14]and our scheme described 
in Section6. Blantom in [11]proposes a solution  
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using the CL signatures [12]. To establish 
anonymous authentication, the CL signature is 
combined with a Zero Knowledge Proof 
ofKnowledge (ZKPK) protocols. The computational 
complexity of Blantom solution depends on the 
subscription type and is variable. Lu et al. 
[13]propose a pairing-based cryptographic scheme 
ensuring anonymous authentication of users 
accessing cloud services. A user has to sign a 
challenge received from a server and then he/she 
sends it back to verify it. Chow et al. [14]employ 
group signature schemes proposed by Boyen and 
Waters in [15]and [18](BW schemes). The BW 
scheme [18]is used to make a group signature 
which provides the anonymous authentication of 
users. Nevertheless, these solutions have 6 pairing 
operations in verification.In the next section, we 
present our solution that does not use expensive 
pairing operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Group signatures as a basic part in privacy 
enhancing cloud services 
 
Group signature schemes are used in many 
privacy enhancing cryptographic protections that 
are applied in cloud services. Group signatures 
were introduced by Chaum and Heyst [8] in 
1991. Their main purpose is to allow members of 
a group sign messages on behalf of the group. 
Every group member can sign a message by 
own group member secret key gsk[i] that is 
usually issued by a group manager. A verifier 
checks the validity of the signature with a group 
public key gpk. The verifier is able to verify that 
the signer is indeed the member of the group 
while the signer's identity is not released. The 
identities of the members are traceable only in 
certain circumstances, e.g. breaking the rules.  
 
Revocation can be done by the group manager or 
a revocation manager who owns group manager’s 
secret key gmsk. The group signature schemes 
usually employ the following entities: 
 
•.Group manager – this entity adds group 
members into a group, and generates and issues 
the secret keys of group members. 
 
• Revocation manager – this entity disclosures 
the identity of dishonest members. 
 
• User – a group member who owns the group 
member secret key gsk[i]. The user can sign a 
message on behalf of the group. 
 
• Verifier – this entity verifies the validity of the 
signature by using the group public key gpk. 
 
Currently, there are many variants of group 
signatures schemes which differ mainly in their 
properties such as the level of anonymity, security, 
efficiency and the length of signature. Group 
signatures can be understood as a subset of 
attribute authentication systems, which contain 
only one attribute representing a membership in a 
group. Group signatures schemes usually provide 
the following properties: 
 
• Unforgeability - only an unrevoked group 
member can create a valid signature on behalf of 
the group. 
 
• Anonymity– a verifier is not able to determine 
the identity of a signer. 
 
• Complete anonymity – if an attacker obtains a 
valid signature and knows gpk and all keys of 
group members’ gsk[i], he is not able to determine 
the identity of a signer. 
 
• Traceability - all members can be tracked by the 
group manager or the revocation manager by 
member’s signed message. 
 
• Unlinkability- a verifier and other members are 
not able to link two signatures which have been 
signed by one member of the group. 
 
• Coalition-resistance- it is impossible to create a 
valid signature by a subgroup of users. 
 
Solutions: Communication overhead 
Signing 
(Authenticate) Verification
Blantom 
solution [11] various 
various 
(approx. 30p 
+31e + 12m) 
6p + 17e + 
5m 
Lu et al. 
solution [13] 5 elements 14e + 10m 
6p + 1e + 
2m 
Chow et al. 
solution [13] 6 elements 14e + 15m 
6p + 1e + 
6m 
Our solution 12 elements 10e + 8m 12e + 6m 
 
Table 1. Performance Analysis  
of Solutions in Cloud Computing. 
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• Exculpability – even group manager is not able 
to create a valid signature of a group member. 
 
• Correctness - every correct signature of the group 
member has to be always accepted during 
verification. 
 
• Revocation–a revoked member is not able to 
create valid signatures on behalf of the group. 
 
• Differentiation of group members - all 
members of the group must have a different gsk[i]. 
 
• Immediate-revocation – if a group member is 
revoked, his capability of creating the group 
signatures is disabled immediately. 
 
5. Our solution 
 
In this chapter, we introduce our security solution 
for privacy-preserving cloud services. We outline 
our system model depicted in Figure 1, security 
requirements, cryptography background and 
cryptographic protocols. 
 
 
Figure 1. System model. 
 
5.1 System Model 
 
Our solution consists of three fundamental parties: 
 
Cloud Service Provider (CSP). CSP manages 
cloud services and shared storages. CSP isusually 
a company which behaves as a partly trusted 
party. CSP provides cloud services, authenticates 
users when they access a cloud service. CSP also 
issues access attributes to users. Nevertheless, 
when CSP needs to revoke and identify a 
malicious user then CSP must collaborate with a 
revocation manager. 
 
Revocation Manager (RM). RM is a partly trusted 
party, e.g. government authority, who decides if 
the revocation of a user identity is rightful or not. 
Only the cooperation between CSP and RM can 
reveal the user identity. RM also cooperates with 
CSP during user registration when the user’s 
access attributes are issued. 
 
User (U). U is an ordinary customer who accesses 
into a cloud and uses cloud services, shared 
storages, etc. Users are anonymous if they 
properly follow the rules of CSP. To increase 
security, users use tamper-resistant devices or 
protected local storages. 
 
5.2 Requirements 
 
Our solution provides the following security 
requirements: 
 
•-Anonymity. Every honest user stays 
anonymous when uses cloud services. User 
identities are hidden if users behave honestly 
and do not break rules. 
 
• Confidentiality. Every user’s session to CSP is 
confidential. No one without a secret session key is 
able to obtain data transmitted between U and CSP. 
 
• Integrity. Data sent in user’s session cannot be 
modified without a secret session key 
 
•-Unlinkability. The user’s sessions to cloud 
services are unlinkable. No one besides CSP 
collaborating with RM is able to link two or more 
sessions between a certain U and CSP. 
 
• Untraceability. Other users are unable to trace 
user’s authentication and concrete users’ 
communication. 
 
• Revocation. Every user can be revoked by the 
collaboration of CSP and RM. 
 
5.3 Cryptography Used 
 
In our solution, we use discrete logarithm 
commitments described in the work [19]. We have 
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transformed the scheme [19] into a group 
signature scheme mode.Further,the solution 
employs Ȉ-protocols [20]to prove of discrete 
logarithm knowledge, representation and 
equivalence [21]. To revoke a user, we use the 
Okamoto-Uchiyama Trapdoor One-Way Function 
described in [22]. For more details about the used 
basic cryptographic blocks see prior 
works[19]and[23]. 
 
6. Ourproposed protocol 
 
Our protocol consists of five phases: initialization, 
registration, anonymous access, secure 
communication and revocation. The basic principle 
of the proposed protocol is depicted in Figure 2. 
 
•.{tc "1 The Basic Principle of the Proposed 
Protocol." \f f} 
 
6.1 Initialization 
 
The initialization phase is run by Cloud Service 
Provider (CSP) and Revocation Manager (RM). 
CSP generates a group H defined by a large prime  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
modulus ݌, generators݄ଵǡ ݄ଶ of prime order ݍ and 
ݍȁ݌ െ ͳ. CSP generates a RSA key pair and stores 
own private keyܭ஼ௌ௉. 
 
M generates a group G defined by a large modulus 
݊ ൌ ݎଶݏ where ݎ ൌ ʹݎᇱ ൅ ͳǡ ݏ ൌ ʹݏᇱ ൅ ͳ and  
ݎǡ ݏǡ ݎᇱǡ ݏԢare large primes. RM also generates a 
generator ଵ݃ אோ Ժ௡כ of order݋ݎ݀ሺ ଵ݃݉݋݀ݎଶሻ ൌ
ݎሺݎ െ ͳሻ in Ժ௥మכ and ݋ݎ݀ሺ ଵ݃ሻ ൌ ݎݎԢݏԢin Ժ௡כand 
randomly chooses secret values ଵܵǡ ܵଶǡ ܵଷ. RM 
computes authentication proof ܣ௣௥௢௢௙ ൌ
ଵ݃
ௌభ݉݋݀݊which is public and common for all 
entities in system. In our solution, the RM is able to 
issue more types of authentication 
proofsܣ௣௥௢௢௙ଵ ǥܣ௣௥௢௢௙ே derived from ଵܵଵ ǥ ଵܵேthat are 
related to different user rights in cloud services. 
 
Finally, RM computes generators ݃ଶ ൌ
ଵ݃
ௌమ݉݋݀݊and ݃ଷ ൌ ଵ݃ௌయ݉݋݀݊and stores secret 
valuesݎǡ ݏas revocation keyܭோ௄. 
 
All public cryptographic parameters 
ݍǡ ݌ǡ ݊ǡ ଵ݃ǡ ݃ଶǡ ݃ଷǡ ݄ଵǡ ݄ଶǡ ܣ௣௥௢௢௙ are published and 
shared.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The basic principle of the proposed protocol. 
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6.2 Registration 
 
In the registration phase, a user registers and 
requests a user master key which they use in 
anonymous access to cloud services. 
 
Firstly, U must physically register on CSP. CSP 
checks user’s ID. Then, U generates secret values 
߱ଵǡ߱ଶand makes the commitment: ܥ஼ௌ௉ ൌ
݄ଵఠభ݄ଶఠమ݉݋݀݌. U digitally signs ܥ஼ௌ௉, e.g. by RSA, 
and sends this signature ܵ݅݃௎ሺܥ஼ௌ௉ሻwith the 
construction of correctness proof PK൛߱ଵǡ ߱ଶǣܥ஼ௌ௉ ൌ
݄ͳ߱ͳ݄ʹ߱ʹ to CSP, by notation of Camenisch and 
Stadler [21]. CSP checks the user’s proof and the 
signature. Then, CSP stores the 
pairܥ஼ௌ௉ǡ ܵ݅݃௎ሺܥ஼ௌ௉ሻ, signs the commitment 
ܵ݅݃஼ௌ௉ሺܥ஼ௌ௉ሻand sends it back to U. 
 
Secondly, U requests a user master key from RM. U 
computesܣԢ௣௥௢௢௙ ൌ ଵ݃ఠభ݃ଶఠమ݉݋݀݊and sends it with 
ܥ஼ௌ௉ǡ ܵ݅݃஼ௌ௉ሺܥ஼ௌ௉ሻ and the construction of 
correctness proof PK൛߱ଵǡ߱ଶǣܥ஼ௌ௉ ൌ ݄ଵఠభ݄ଶఠమ רܣԢ݌ݎ݋݋݂ൌ݃ͳ߱ͳ݃ʹ߱ʹ to RM. RM checks the proof, 
CSP’s signatureܵ݅݃஼ௌ௉ሺܥ஼ௌ௉ሻ and computes a secret 
contribution ߱ோெ such that 
ܣ௣௥௢௢௙ ൌ ଵ݃ఠభ݃ଶఠమ݃ଷఠೃಾ݉݋݀݊holds. After this step, U 
obtains own user master key ܭ௎ which is 
tripletሺ߱ଵǡ ߱ଶǡ ߱ோெሻǤ U gets value ߱ோெ only with 
cooperation with RM which knows the factorization of 
݊. To prevent the collusion attack, user’s߱ଵǡ߱ଶ is not 
visible outwardly to a user because ߱ଵǡ߱ଶ is stored in 
a tamper-resistant memory. This device which stores 
the user secret key should be also protected against 
a key estimation by side channel attacks, such as in 
[24]. Further, U cannot make own user master key 
because only RM knowsܭோ௄. Any honest user can 
repeat the request for the user master key or demand 
other authentication proofs if CSP agrees with that.  
 
6.3 Anonymous Access 
 
In this phase, the ݅-th user ௜ܷ anonymously 
accesses Cloud Service Provider (CSP). This 
phase consists of two-messages used to 
authenticate ௜ܷ and establish a secret key 
between ௜ܷ and CSP.  
 
Ȉ ௜ܷ generates a random valueݎܽ݊݀݋݉ אோ ሼͲǡ ͳሽ௟ೞ೤೘. 
The parameter ݈௦௬௠ denotes the size of a shared 
secret key for the symmetric cipher. 
Ȉ ௜ܷ encryptsݎܽ݊݀݋݉ by the RSA public key of CSP. 
 
•The encrypted Enc_PK_server(ݎܽ݊݀݋݉) is 
signed by the Auth_proof_sign algorithm in the 
group signature modewhich ensures user 
anonymous authentication. We assume that 
cryptographic parameters such as 
ݍǡ ݌ǡ ݊ǡ ଵ݃ǡ ݃ଶǡ ݃ଷǡ ݄ଵǡ ݄ଶand authentication proof 
ܣ௣௥௢௢௙ ൌ ଵ݃ఠభ݃ଶఠమ݃ଷఠೃಾ݉݋݀݊ are made public and 
࣢ is a secure hash function. To prove the 
knowledge of the secret user key and 
signݎܽ݊݀݋݉, ௜ܷ performs the Auth_proof_sign 
algorithm: 
ܭௌ אோ ሼͲǡ ͳሽ௟ 
 ܣ ൌ ܣ௣௥௢௢௙௄ೄ ݉݋݀݊ 
 ܥଵ ൌ ݃ଷ
௄ೄഘೃಾ ݉݋݀݊ 
 ܥଶ ൌ ݃ଷ௄ೄ݉݋݀݊ 
 ݎଵǡ ݎଶ אோ ሼͲǡ ͳሽ௠ା௞ାଷ௟ 
 ݎଷ אோ ሼͲǡ ͳሽ௠ା௞ାସǤହ௟ 
 ݎ௦ אோ ሼͲǡ ͳሽ௠ା௞ା௟ 
 ܣ௣௥௢௢௙തതതതതതതത ൌ ଵ݃௥భ݃ଶ௥మ݃ଷ௥య݉݋݀݊ 
 ܣҧ ൌ ܣ௣௥௢௢௙௥ೄ ݉݋݀݊ 
 ܥଵതതത ൌ ݃ଷ௥య݉݋݀݊ 
 ܥଶതതത ൌ ݃ଷ௥ೄ݉݋݀݊ 
ܿ ൌ
࣢(Enc_PK_server(ݎܽ݊݀݋݉),
ܣǡ ܣҧǡ ܣ௣௥௢௢௙തതതതതതതതǡ ܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଵതതതǡ ܥଶതതതሻ 
 ݖଵ ൌ ݎଵ െ ܿܭௌഘభ  
 ݖଶ ൌ ݎଶ െ ܿܭௌഘమ  
 ݖଷ ൌ ݎଷ െ ܿܭௌഘೃಾ  
 ݖௌ ൌ ݎௌ െ ܿܭௌ 
 
Finally, the signature elements 
ܣǡ ܣҧǡ ܣ௣௥௢௢௙തതതതതതതതܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଵതതതǡ ܥଶതതതǡ ݖଵǡ ݖଶǡ ݖଷǡ ݖௌ, 
Enc_PK_server(ݎܽ݊݀݋݉) are sent to CSP as a 
request message.  
 
• CSP verifies the signed request message that 
consists of the signature elements: 
Enc_PK_server(ݎܽ݊݀݋݉),ܣǡ ܣҧǡ ܣ௣௥௢௢௙തതതതതതതത,  
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ܥଵǡ ܥଶǡ ܥଵതതതǡ ܥଶതതതǡ ݖଵǡ ݖଶǡ ݖଷǡ ݖௌ. Then, CSP does the 
Auth_proof_verify algorithm: 
 
 ܥଵ ء ܥଶ௥௘௩݉݋݀݊ 
ܣ௣௥௢௢௙തതതതതതതത ؠ ܣ௘ ଵ݃௭భ݃ଶ௭మ݃ଷ௭య݉݋݀݊ 
 ܣҧ ؠ ܣ௘ܣ௣௥௢௢௙௭ೄ ݉݋݀݊ 
 ܥଵതതത ؠ ܥଵ௘݃ଷ௭య݉݋݀݊ 
 ܥଶതതത ؠ ܥଶ௘݃ଷ௭ೄ݉݋݀݊ 
 
If above equations hold then CSP continues in the 
next step. Otherwise, CSP stops the algorithm. 
 
• CSP decrypts a value Enc_PK_server(ݎܽ݊݀݋݉) 
by its RSA private key to obtainݎܽ݊݀݋݉.  
 
•-CSP randomly generates shared secret key 
K_sym and uses eXclusive OR (XOR) function to 
compute ݎܽ݊݀݋ْ݉K_sym. 
 
•-CSP sends a response message 
(ݎܽ݊݀݋ْ݉K_sym) back to ௜ܷ. 
 
6.4 Secure Communication 
 
If the anonymous access phase is successful, 
the user ௜ܷcan upload and download data from 
CSP. Data confidentiality and integrity are 
secured by a symmetric cipher. We propose to 
use AES which is well know cipher and is 
supported by many types of software and 
hardware platforms. To encrypt and decrypt 
transmitted data, ௜ܷand CSP use the AES secret 
key K_sym established in the previous phase. 
 
6.5 Revocation 
 
Depending on the case of rule breaking, the 
revocation phase can revoke a user and/or user 
anonymity. 
 
If users misuse a cloud service, they get revoked 
by RM. Because RM knows the factorization of݊, 
RM is able to extract߱ோெ. Firstly, RM extracts the 
random session value ܭௌ from ܥଶ and the secret 
RM contribution value ߱ோெ fromܥଵ. 
 
 
Then, RM publishes ߱ோெ into a public blacklist. If 
the user uses revoked key then the equation 
ܥଵ ؠ ܥଶఠೃಾ݉݋݀݊holds and the user access to 
cloud services is denied. 
 
If a malicious user breaks the rules of CSP, this 
user can be identified by the collaboration of RM 
and CSP. Firstly, RM extracts ߱ோெ from the 
suspected session received by CSP. Then, RM 
finds the corresponding ܥ஼ௌ௉ in the database. If 
CSP provides to RM the explicit evidence of user’s 
breach, then RM sends ܥ஼ௌ௉to CSP. CSP is able to 
open the identity of a user from database but only 
with RM’s help. 
 
7. Experimental results 
 
In this section, we outline the experimental results of 
our solution. We compare our solution with related 
solutions and output the performance evaluation. 
 
7.1 Performance Evaluation of Our Solution 
 
We have implemented our proposed solution in 
JAVA. In practice, we expect that U as an end 
node uses devices with reasonable computational 
power such as a personal computer, a laptop, a 
tablet or a smartphone. On the other hand, we 
assume that CSP keeps servers with sufficient 
computational capacity to ensure hundreds 
sessions with end nodes in real time. We have 
tested our solution on a machine with Intel(R) 
Xeon(R) CPU X3440 @ 2.53GHz, 4 GB Ram. In 
our a proof-of-concept implementation, we 
choose the 1024-bit length of modulo. The main 
important part of our solution is the Anonymous 
Access phase. In this phase, a user (U) 
communicate with a Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP). The computation process on the user side 
is marked as the Sing/Authenticate process. The 
computation process on the CSP side is marked 
as the Verify process. We have measured the 
total time of the Sing/Authenticate process and 
the Verify process. In the Verify process, Table 2 
shows two scenarios: with an empty black list and 
with the black list that contains the revoked 
values rev = 10. The influence of the size of 
blacklist on the total time of the Verify process is 
depicted in Figure 3. 
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7.2 Comparison with Related Work 
 
We compare our Anonymous Access phase with 
the authentication phase of related solutions: 
Blantom solution [12], Lu et al. solution [13]and 
Chow et al. solution [14]. To ensure objectivity, we 
compare the number of atomical cryptographic and 
math operations for each solution. 
 
Firstly, we compare the Sign/Authenticate process 
that runs on the user side. In the Sign/Authenticate 
process, Lu et al. solution [13]takes 14 exp + 10 
mul, Chow et al. solution [14]takes 14 exp + 15 mul 
and Blantom’s solution [12]takes tens of pairing and 
exponentiation operations. The number of 
operations in Blantom’s solution [12] depends on  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the subscription type and is variable. Our 
Sign/Authenticate process takes only 8 exp + 5 mul 
and is the most efficient from compared solutions. 
 
The Verify process on the CSP side has 10 exp 
+ 6 mul in our solution. We emphasize that our 
solution has 0 paring operations. Lu et al. 
solution [13], Chow et al. solution [14]and 
Blantom solution [12]are pairing based and 
contain 6 pairing operations in the Verify 
process.Figure 4 depicts the performance of the 
verifyprocess of our and related solutions. The 
verify process of our solution is more efficient 
than related solutions in this comparison and 
takes only 28 % of the total time of Lu et al. 
solution [13]or Chow et al. solution [14]. 
Sessions [#] Sign/Authenticate Total time [ms] Verify 
Verify with rev 
= 10 
1 54 70 106 
10 526 721 920 
20 1042 1272 1891 
50 2504 3328 4091 
 
Table 2. Performance Evaluation of Our Solution. 
 
 
Figure 3. Influence of the length of the blacklist on the total time of verification. 
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7.3 Comparison of our group signature scheme 
with the related work 
 
In this section, we analyze group signature 
schemes from open literatureandcompare them 
with ourgroup signature schemeused in our 
proposal, see Table 3.In the following part, we 
analyze group signature schemes and describe 
their evolution. 
 
Group signatures were introduced and first four 
schemes were presented in the work CHH91[8]in 
1991. The main disadvantage of these schemes is 
long sizes of a group public key gpk and a 
signature. Sizes depend on the number of 
members in a group. If a new member is added to 
the group, it is necessary to modify gpk. These 
deficiencies are very impractical for large groups of 
members. Therefore, these schemes are not 
suitable in cloud services. In the work CS97[26], 
published in 1997, authors propose a scheme 
which using the constant size of gpk and 
signatures. New members can be added to the 
group without the need to generate a new key pair 
gpk and gsk[i]. The paper ACJT00[27], introduced 
in 2000, presents an efficient scheme which is 
resistant of coalition, i.e. it is impossible for a 
subset of the group members including the group 
manager to create a valid signature. The  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
disadvantage of the scheme is missing of the 
revocation of group members and prevention to a 
revoked member generates the valid signatures on 
behalf of the group. The work AST02 [28], 
published in 2002, is based on the scheme 
ACJT00 [27] and adds the revocation of the group 
members without using a time stamp. This 
approach keeps a constant length of a signature, 
i.e. this length does not increase linearly with the 
number of revoked members. However, the 
scheme has more operations in signing and 
verification phases than related schemes.The 
scheme TX03 [29], published in 2003, provides the 
dynamic revocation of group members. Revoked 
members are no longer able to create a valid 
signature. On the other hand, the disadvantage is 
that, gpk has to be recalculated when a member is 
added to the group or remove from the group. This 
approach is highly inefficient in the real time 
systems working with large groups. The schemes 
BS04 [30] and BBS04 [31], published in 2004, 
allow to create short group signatures. These 
schemes are based on bilinear maps and produce 
short signatures which are suitable in systems 
where bandwidth is restricted.Unless as the 
previous schemes that are secure in the random 
oracle model, the scheme BMW03 [32], introduced 
in 2003, is secure in the standard model. 
Nevertheless, the scheme is designed for the static 
 
 
Figure 4. Performance of the verify process. 
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and small groups of users. Therefore, this scheme 
is not proper for cloud services. 
 
The scheme ACHM05 [33], introduced in 2005, is 
provable secure in the standard model and works 
with dynamic groups. The scheme provides 
anonymity, unforgeability, untraceability and 
exculpability, and is secure against a non-adaptive 
adversary who does not have gsk[i] of group 
members. The scheme BW06 [15] provides the 
provable security in the standard model. But, the 
size of the signature depends on the size of the 
group. The newer scheme BW07 [18], introduced 
in 2007, produces shorter and almost constantly 
sized signature in comparison with the previous 
schemes. The length of a signature increases 
logarithmically as the size of the group. 
 
The scheme LCSL07 [34] produces short 
signatures with constant lengths. This scheme 
offers full anonymity and full traceability, and the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
public key and signatures are shorter than in the 
previous schemes. The scheme G07 [35], 
published in 2007, ensures full anonymity in the 
standard model. The scheme is based on bilinear 
groups and produces the constant lengths of keys 
and signatures. The scheme also supports the 
dynamic addition of new members to the group. 
 
We compare our scheme with the group signature 
schemes in Table 3.Our scheme is based on non-
bilinear assumptions and has only 10 
exponentiations and 8 multiplications in the 
verification phase. Our scheme clearly outperforms 
the related schemes. The operations are 
abbreviated as bp– bilinearpairings, e - 
exponentiation, mul– multiplication,div - division, 
add – addition (subtraction), H–hash, k- length of 
identities in bits,m - length of message in bits, RL–
members in a revocation list, EF - efficiently 
computable isomorphism from G2 toG1, T – the 
total time of a period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Group Signatures Schemes with Our Solution. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we present our novel security 
solution for privacy-preserving cloud services. We 
propose the non-bilinear group signaturesscheme 
to ensure the anonymous authentication of cloud 
service clients. Our novel solution offers user 
anonymity in the authentication phase, data 
integrity and confidentiality and the fair revocation 
process for all users. Users use tamper resistant 
devices during the generation and storing of user 
keys to protect against collusion attacks. 
 
Our authentication phase, which is based on the 
non-bilinear group signature scheme, is more 
efficient than related solutions on the client side 
and also on the server side due to missing 
expensive bilinear pairing operations and fewer 
exponentiation operations.Thus, cloud service 
providers using our solution can authenticate more 
clients in the same time. We also analyze related 
group signature schemes. The group signature 
scheme used in our solution is more efficient than 
related group signature schemes in the verification 
phase and provides the efficient privacy-preserving 
access to cloud services. 
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